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tion of our brain-processes or our mental changes; for the intuition is realized at every moment of such duration, and must be due to a permanently present cause. This cause—probably the simultaneous presence of brain-processes of different phase—fluctuates; and hence a certain range of variation in the amount of the intuition, and in its subdivisibility, accrues.

WILLIAM JAMES.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

C. Classification of the Subject.

There can be but one method for all science for the reason that the method is nothing but the idea itself in its self-development or self-explication, and that there is but One Idea.

Since there are three phases of the idea, this discourse on religion and its development must have three parts. The idea of religion will be considered first in its universality, secondly in the phase of particularity, wherein the idea has parts and distinctions, and which is the phase of differentiation, particularization or limitation (*Urtheil*), of difference and finitude. The third topic is the reunion of the idea within itself, which forms the conclusion, where the idea returns to itself from the phase of determination (in which it was inadequate to itself) and becomes adequate to its form by cancelling its limitations. This is the rhythm of spirit itself, its pulse, eternal life; without this movement it would be death. It is the essence of spirit to have itself for its object, and thence arises its manifestation. But here spirit is as yet in the relation of objectivity, and in this relation it is finite. The third phase is, that spirit becomes an object to itself in such a manner that it is reconciled to and united with itself again in the object, and, by thus being again one with it, it arrives at itself once more, and attains thereby its freedom. For freedom means to be self-contained (*bei sich selbst zu sein*).

This rhythm, which forms the movement of the totality of our science and of the entire development of the idea, is repeated within each of the three phases which have been mentioned above,

because each of these in its determinateness is in itself or potentially the totality. In the last phase totality becomes actual, or exists for itself. The idea therefore appears first in the form of universality, next in that of particularity, and lastly in the form of singularity or individuality. Consequently, the general movement of our science is that the idea appears divided into its elements (in the same way in which the simple unit of a concept or notion becomes divided into subject and object, when by predi-cating of it one of its qualities we form a judgment of it), and in the conclusion the idea becomes again self-united.¹ Thus there will be in each of the three spheres of this movement a similar development of the phases, with this difference, however, that in the first sphere this development is held together in the category of universality, in the second sphere (that of particularity) the phases appear independent, while in the third sphere (that of singularity or individuality) the development arrives at a union (*Schluss*) which has been mediated through the totality of the determinations or categories.

This classification is therefore [simply a statement of] the spirit's own movement and of its nature and activity, and we are, so to speak, simply the spectators. This classification results with necessity from the movement of the Idea itself; this necessity, however, must prove itself in the course of this development. The classification, therefore, whose parts and content we now proceed to give, is simply historical.

I. *The General Idea of Religion.*

The first is the idea in its universality, upon which follows, in the second place, the determinateness of the idea—that is,

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—This sentence is a paraphrase rather than a translation. The words which Hegel uses here, *Urtheil* and *Schluss*, have in his terminology a peculiar meaning which cannot be given by any equivalent direct expression in English, but of which it seemed desirable to give some idea. At a first glance, the literal translation of the original seems to be: The general movement of our science is, that the idea becomes a judgment and then completes itself in a syllogism. Hegel, however, uses the word *Urtheil* (judgment) in a sense different from that which it ordinarily has, and employs it in the rarer meaning of "original division or partition" (*Ur-Theil*). In the same way *Schluss*, the word used in German for a syllogism, means literally a locking or linking together. Thus Hegel's expression, that the idea in its second phase becomes an *Urtheil* and in its third is completed in the *Schluss*, describes well the movement of the idea through the stages of particularity and reunion.

the idea in its determinate forms. The latter are necessarily connected with the idea, because in a philosophical inquiry the universal (*i. e.*, the general idea) is placed first not merely in order to occupy a place of honor. In unphilosophical books it may happen that the general ideas (for instance, those of Right, of Nature) are made universal determinations and are placed first. They are rather embarrassing when thus employed [because they seem to be of no special use there]. They are [stated but] hardly seriously discussed, since the notion prevails that they do not possess the same importance as the content proper of the book which is treated of in the subsequent chapters. The so-called general idea seems to have no bearing on the remaining content, except that it maps out to some extent the scope of the subject, so that there may be no introduction of foreign matter. The rest of the content (for instance, magnetism, electricity) is looked upon as the real subject, and the idea as a mere form. Where such a view prevails, the idea (for instance, that of Right), which is placed at the head of a treatise, becomes a mere name for a most abstract and contingent content.

In a philosophical discourse the idea forms the beginning as well, but the idea is also the content itself; it is the absolute subject, the substance; it is like a germ from which the whole tree grows. In the germ are contained all the determinations of the tree—its whole nature, its kind of sap, its ramifications—but not in such a manner that through a microscope one could see in the germ miniature twigs and leaves; the content is there spiritually. In the same way the idea contains the whole nature of the subject, and the cognition of the latter is but the development of the idea, or, in other words, the development of what is potentially contained in the idea but has not yet assumed existence and is waiting for explication and unfolding. We therefore begin with the idea of religion.

1. THE PHASE OF UNIVERSALITY.

The first thing in the idea of religion is again the universal. It is the phase of thinking in its universality. We do not think this or that object, but thinking thinks itself. The object is the universal, which, when active, is Thought. Religion, in so far as it is the elevation to truth, has its starting-point in sensuous,

finite objects. Yet, if the continuation were but a constant passing to other finite objects, it would be a faulty process continued *ad infinitum*, mere words by which no conclusion is ever reached. Thinking, on the contrary, should be the elevation from what is limited to what is absolutely universal, and religion exists for thinking and in thinking alone. God is not the highest emotion, but the highest thought; even when he is dragged down to the realm of image-conception, the content of this concept still belongs to the world of thought. The great error of our age is the opinion that thinking is injurious to religion, and that the latter enjoys a surer existence in proportion as the former is relinquished. This mistake arises from a total misapprehension of higher spiritual relationship. Similarly, in regard to the Idea of Right, good-will is often looked upon as if it were something by itself and stood in a certain contrast to intelligence, and it is imagined that the less a person thinks, the more truly good is his will. By no means! Right and morality exist only because I am a thinking being, and because I do not look upon my freedom as upon that of an empirical person, as belonging to me as an individual. Were it otherwise, I might try and enslave my neighbor through stratagem or violence, but I refrain because I consider freedom as something existing in and for itself, as a universal.

In asserting that religion contains the phase of thinking in its perfect universality, and that the unlimited universal is the highest and absolute thought, we do not yet make the distinction between subjective and objective thinking. The universal is object and is thinking absolutely, but not yet developed in itself and as yet without further determinations. In it there is an absence and cancellation of all distinctions; in this ether of thought all finitude has disappeared, everything has vanished, and yet everything is therein contained. But this element of universality cannot yet be determined; in this water, in this transparency, nothing has as yet assumed form and shape.

The continuation of this process is, that the universal now determines itself for itself [or, in other words, actualizes itself], and this self-determination constitutes the idea of God. In the sphere of universality the Idea itself is the material in which the determinations occur, and the process appears in divine forms; but this alienation or formation remains only latent in the divine Idea

because the latter is still all substantiality; in its determination of eternity it remains in the depths of universality.

2. THE PHASE OF PARTICULARITY, OR THE SPHERE OF DIFFERENTIATION.

The particularization or differentiation which in the sphere of universality is still latent, constitutes, after it has once made its appearance actually, another or alien existence in contrast with the [former] extreme of universality. This other extreme is consciousness as individuality, and nothing else. It is the subject in its immediateness, with all its needs, conditions, sins, and the whole empirical and temporal character appertaining to that stage.

The relation between the two sides in this determination is found in my own individuality and its religion. I, the thinking being, that which is in a state of elevation, the actively universal, and I, the immediate subject, are one and the same. The relation between these two sides which seem to stand in such a rigid contrast, merely finite consciousness and being on one hand, and the infinite on the other, is established for myself in religion. By thinking I rise to the Absolute, above all finitude, and become infinite consciousness, while I remain at the same time finite self-consciousness in accordance with my entire empirical determination. Both sides as well as their relation exist for myself. Both sides seek and avoid each other. At one time, for instance, I lay stress on my empirical, finite consciousness and contrast myself with infinity, and at another time I exclude myself from myself; I condemn myself and allow the infinite consciousness to have sway. The middle term of the syllogism contains but the determinations of the two extremes. The two sides do not resemble the columns of Hercules, which, while close to each other, stand opposite each other without any contact. I am, and there is within myself and for myself this contradiction and this conciliation. My own being within, since it is infinite, stands in contrast to myself as finite. I find within myself the determination as finite consciousness, and also, in contrast with it, my thinking, which has the determination of infinite consciousness. I am the feeling, the perception, the image-representation of this union and of this contradiction, and I am at the same time that in which these contraries are held together. I am that which endeavors to hold them

together, and I am the labor of the mind by which it tries to master this contradiction.

I am thus the relation between these two sides, which are not abstract determinations, like finite and infinite, but of which each is the totality itself. Each of these two extremes is the Ego—that which constitutes the relation, and which holds the extremes together. The relation is identical with the principles which are at strife within One, and which become One in this struggle. I am the struggle, for the struggle is naught but the contradiction which consists in the fact that those two are not in a state of indifference toward each other on account of being diverse, but are, on the contrary, tied to each other. I am not one of the two that are struggling, but I am the two combatants, and I am the struggle. I am the fire and the water which are here in contact, and I am the contact and the union of those that flee from each other; the contact is but the double, contradictory relation subsisting bewteen elements which are now separated and divided, and then again conciliated and united.

We shall see that the forms in which this relation of the two extremes exists are:

1. Feeling.
2. Sense-perception (*Anschauung*).
3. Image-representation (*Vorstellung*).

Before we enter into the sphere of these relations we shall have to cognize it in its necessity, inasmuch as this sphere, on account of being the elevation of the finite consciousness to the Absolute, contains the forms of religious consciousness. In exploring this necessity of religion, we shall have to look upon it as being posited by something else.

At the very beginning of this mediation, when it initiates us to the circle of those forms of consciousness, religion will appear to us as a result which is just cancelling this determination of being a result. Religion, consequently, will present itself as the first principle by which everything else is mediated and on which it depends. We shall thus see in that which has been mediated the interaction of movement and of necessity which move forward and repel at the same time. But this mediation of necessity should also be posited within religion itself, in order that the relation and essential connection of the two sides embraced by religious

spirit may be known as necessary. The forms of feeling, sense-perception, and image-representation, proceeding necessarily one from another, move onward into that sphere in which the inner mediation of their phases manifests its own necessity. The sphere in which this takes place is that of thinking; in it religious consciousness will grasp itself in its idea. These two mediations of necessity, of which one leads to religion, while the other takes place within religious self-consciousness itself, include the forms of religious consciousness as it appears in the forms of feeling, sense-perception, and image-representation.

3. THE ANNULMENT OF THE DIFFERENTIATION, OR THE CULTUS.

The movement in the preceding sphere is that of the idea of God or of the absolute Idea, by which it seeks to become objective to itself. This movement we find even in this statement of the idea: God is spirit. Spirit cannot be single individuality; it is spirit only by being objective to itself and by seeing itself in its other. The highest determination of spirit is self-consciousness, which implies this objectivity. God as Idea is subject for an object, and object for some subject. When the phase of subjectivity determines itself further, so that the distinction arises between God as object of thought and the thinking spirit, then the subjective side is determined in this difference as belonging to the side of finitude. These two, then, stand in contrast to each other in such a manner that their separation constitutes the contrast between finitude and infinity. But this infinity, on account of the contrast which still clings to it, is not the true one; the absolute object remains another existence for the subjective side (which is for itself), and the relation of the subjective to the absolute is not self-consciousness. There is also in this connection the relation that the finite in its separation knows itself to be transitory and naught, and its object to be the absolute and its own substance. Here the primary relation which takes place is that of fear toward the absolute object, because, compared with it, individuality knows itself to be accident, transitoriness, and evanescence. But this standpoint of separation is not a true standpoint, since it knows itself as being nugatory, as being in a state which should be cancelled; its relation is therefore not simply negative, but latently positive. The subject recognizes its own essence in the substance

into which it is to become merged through self-cancellation ; it recognizes it as its own substance, in which, for this reason, self-consciousness will be preserved potentially. This union, conciliation, and rehabilitation of the subject and of its self-consciousness, the positive feeling that it participates and shares in the Absolute, and the wish to arrive at a real union with the latter, constitute a cancellation of the separation and form the phase of Cultus or worship. The Cultus comprises this whole inward and outward activity which has for its purpose the rehabilitation of the unity. The expression "Cultus" or "worship" is ordinarily used in the narrower sense of external, public actions ; this definition does not lay stress on the inward activity of the soul. The meaning which we shall attach to the word Cultus will comprise this inward activity as well as its outward manifestation ; this activity is to bring about the rehabilitation of the union with the Absolute, and is therefore an inner conversion of spirit and soul. The Christian Cultus or worship contains, for instance, not only the sacraments, church-rites, and duties, but also the so-called "way of salvation" which is an absolutely inward history and a succession of acts of the soul, a movement which is to take place, and does take place, within the soul.

In each stage of religion we shall find these two sides in correspondence with each other—namely, the side of self-consciousness, which is the Cultus or worship, and the side of consciousness, which is the image-representation.¹ The content of the concept of God, which is consciousness, is determined in the same way as the relation of the subject to Him, which is self-consciousness. The one phase is always the copy of the other, and ever suggests the other. One of these modes grasps the finite consciousness only, the other pure self-consciousness ; both are therefore one-sided, and bear their annulment or cancellation in themselves.

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Hegel distinguishes between the Idea of God as consciousness and as self-consciousness. The mind may be conscious of God as of the Supreme Being which stands above him, and in whose existence in the universe he believes as firmly as that of the external objects which he sees in nature. He is conscious of God as the Ruler of heaven and universe. This is the consciousness of God as an external existence. But man sees the Divine not merely as an external existence ; he feels that his own soul also is of divine origin and nature. When the Divine is recognized within, it is an act of self-consciousness. Hence religion is the cognition of the Divine without, or consciousness, and of the Divine within, or self-consciousness.

It was therefore a one-sided view, if the old, natural theology looked upon God as merely an object of consciousness. This view of the Idea of God may perhaps employ the words "spirit" or "person," but its real conception of God could never rise higher than to the idea of an Essence. It was inconsistent. If it had been consistent, it would certainly have arrived at the subjective side, or that of self-consciousness.

It is equally one-sided to look upon religion as subjectivity [or self-consciousness] only, for this would limit it to the subjective side altogether. It would make all cultus and worship perfectly barren and void; its actions would be a movement without progress; its direction toward God would be the relation to a nought, and have no definite aim. This merely subjective activity, too, is inconsistent, and must therefore cancel itself. For, if the subjective side is to have any determination at all, the concept of spirit implies that the latter is consciousness, and that its determination will become its object. The richer the mind and the fuller it is determined, the richer will be its object. The absoluteness of the feeling which is supposed to be substantial would necessarily imply that it disengages itself from its subjectivity; for the substantial element, which is said to be its characteristic, is certainly opposed to the accidents of mere opinion and inclination, since it is fixed in and for itself; it has in and for itself an objective existence and is independent of our feeling and sentiment. If the Substantial remained simply in our heart, it could not be recognized as the Supreme; God himself would remain something subjective, and the tendency of subjectivity would be like the drawing of lines into the void. The mere recognition of the Supreme, which this standpoint may express, is the recognition of an indefinite something which has no connection with any objective existence; the lines drawn toward it have no direction, and are and remain simply *our activity, our lines*—things that are altogether subjective. In this standpoint the finite never attains true and real self-alienation. It is necessary that in the cultus or worship spirit should free itself from its finitude and feel and know itself in God. Unless God has independent existence, and unless our relation to him is obligatory, all cultus shrinks into subjectivity. The cultus contains, as essential elements, the actions, immunities, assurances, confirmations, and attestations of some Supreme Existence. These definite

actions, real immunities and assurances, cannot take place if the objective and obligatory element is lacking in them, and it would be an annihilation of the cultus if the subjective side were considered the whole. It would cut off both the progress from consciousness to objective knowledge and the progress from subjective emotion to action. Each of these is most intimately connected with the other. Man's idea of his obligation in regard to God depends on his conception of God; his self-consciousness corresponds to his consciousness. Nor can he, conversely, conceive the idea of any definite obligatory action in regard to God if he has no knowledge or definite conception of Him as an objective Existence. Only when religion becomes a real relation and contains the difference of consciousness can the cultus assume its true form as the cancellation of alienation and become a living process. The movement of the cultus is not limited to this inwardness in which consciousness frees itself from its finitude and becomes consciousness of its essence; and in which the subject, knowing itself to be in God, enters into the fountain-head of its life. Instead of such limitation of the cultus, its infinite life begins to develop in the external direction also, for the subject's or individual's life in the world has substantial consciousness for its basis, and the manner in which the individual determines his aims in life depends on the consciousness of its essential truth. In this respect religion reflects itself in worldly affairs, and the knowledge of the world makes its appearance. This entrance into the real world is essential to religion, and in the transition to the world religion appears as morality in relation to the state and to its entire life. As the religion of a nation, so is its morality and political constitution. The latter depends altogether on the question whether a people has but a limited conception of the freedom of spirit or possesses the true consciousness of freedom.

We shall find, as further determinations of the cultus, the phase of presupposed unity, the sphere of differentiation and of freedom rehabilitating itself from this state of separation or differentiation.

a. The cultus, therefore, generally speaking, is the eternal process of the subject, by which it posits itself identical with its essence.

This process by which the previous diremption is cancelled seems to belong to the subjective side only; yet this determina-

tion is posited in the object of consciousness also. By the cultus, unity is attained ; but that which was not united originally cannot be posited as united. This unity, which appears as action, or as the result of action, must also be cognized in a further phase, as being in-and-for-itself. For that which forms the object of consciousness is the Absolute, and the determination of the latter is, that it is the unity of its absoluteness with particularity. This unity is implied in the object itself, as, for instance, in the Christian idea of God becoming man.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES.

BY J. M. LONG.

1. *Mathematics at the Base of the Sciences.*—Mathematics, in any true classification of the Sciences, must stand at the base. The science of education, as based on the law of mental evolution, determines the order in which the categories, or fundamental ideas, shall be arranged. This law of mental development is from the simple to the complex, from those subjects involving a few elements of thought to those involving many. This law requires that mathematics shall stand at the base of a classified scheme, for this form of scientific intelligence involves only the thought-elements of number and extension as associated with the ideas of time and space.

Space and time “are the conditions of all cognizable existence. Whatever exists, so far as is known or can be known to us, exists in space; and whatever acts, acts in time. Consequently the properties of space and time are conditions of all existence and all action; the laws under which things exist and act can not be proved, nor even stated, without express or implied reference to the properties of space and time. It results from this that mathematics, which is the science of the laws of space and time, is the necessary ground of physical science.”—Whewell.

2. *Definition of Mathematics.*—In seeking a definition of mathematics, out of which all the parts shall be seen to unfold in logical